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IN THE SUP·REME COURT' 
OF THE ST'A TE OIF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
JAMES LEROY HOPKINS, 
Defendarnt ood Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9338 
BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 18, 1960, defendant was convicted of bur-
glary in the second degree in the Third Judicial District 
Court. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term in the 
State Penitentiary. 
Respondent accepts the statement of facts as sub-
mitted in appellant's brief. There are also presented 
h~reinafter in this brief the basic facts as _proved at trial. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CON-
VICT THE DEFENDANT OF THE CRIME OF 
BURGLARY IN THE SECOND DEGREE. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CON-
VICT THE DEFENDANT OF THE CRIME OF 
BURGLARY IN THE SECOND DEGREE. 
Section 76-9-3, U.C.A.1953, defines the offense of sec-
ond degree burglary: 
''Every person who, in the nighttime, forcibly 
breaks and enters, or without force enters an open 
door, window or other aperture of, any house, 
room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, 
store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other build-
ing, or any tent, vessel, water craft, railroad car, 
automobile, automobile trailer, aeroplane or air-
craft with intent to commit larceny or any felony, 
is guilty of burglary in the second degree. * * * '' 
The offense of second degree burglary includes the ele-
ment of intent and appellant's appeal is directed solely 
to that element, viz., whether there was sufficient evidence 
to prove that appellant committed the acts alleged with 
"* * * intent to commit larceny or any felony. * • *." 
We have no substantial disagreement with appellant 
on matters of law. In a criminal conviction, each element 
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of an offense, including that of intent, must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Clark (Utah), 223 P. 
~d 184. rrhe issue here roncerns itself with the proof of 
intent. It is a general rule that intent, being a state of 
mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof and must, 
therefore, be proved by circumstantial evidence. 9 Am . 
.J ur. 271, Burglary, Sec. 61 and 12 C.J.S. 731, Burglary, 
Sec. 55. In State v. Woodruff (1929), 225 N.W. 254, an 
Iowa case, the defendant was apprehended inside a dwell-
ing house at night. It did not appear that he had taken 
any property. He made no explanation as to the reason 
for his presence in the house. On an appeal by the State 
from a directed verdict for the defendant, the Appellate 
Court reversed. The Court said : 
"The general rule is that the in the absence of ex-
planation, the jury may infer from the fact of his 
breaking and entering that his intent was to 
commit larceny. In ascertaining the intent, the 
jury may take into consideration all the other 
facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence, 
and bearing upon that question. 
See also State v. M (J;XWell, 42 Iowa 211. 
In Alexander v. State (Texas), 20 S.W. 756, it was 
said: 
''Although there was no direct evidence of the in-
tent, it might be inferred from the surrounding 
circumstances. The weight to be given these was a 
question properly left to the jury; and when a per-
son enters a building through a window at a late 
hour of the night, after the lights are extinguished, 
and no explanation is given of his intent, it might 
well· be inferred that his ·purpose was to- commit 
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larceny, such being the usual intent under such 
circumstances. '' 
See also Vickery v. State (1911 Texas), 137 S.W. 687. 
In a very recent Idaho case, the court commented on 
the proof of intent in a burglary prosecution. Ex Parte 
Seyfried (1953 Idaho), 264 P. 2d 685. A conviction for 
burglary was taken to the Idaho Supreme Court on a writ 
of habeas corpus. The defendant had been apprehended 
at night in the dwelling house of another by police officers. 
He had taken no property when apprehended. He made 
no explanation of his presence in the house. The court 
held that the magistrate was justified in committing the 
defendant for trial and the order quashing the writ and 
remanding the defendant was affirmed. The court said: 
"Where a dwelling house is broken and entered in 
the nighttime and no lawful motive or purpose is 
shown or appears, or any satisfactory or reason-
able explanation given for such breaking and en-
tering, the presumption arises that the breaking 
and entering were accomplished with the intent 
to commit larceny. The fact that the officers were 
present and apprehended the burglar before he 
had an opportunity to carry his purpose into exe-
cution is of no importance. The crime of burglary 
was consummated when the unlawful entry was 
made with intent to steal or commit some felony 
therein. Sec. 18-1401, I. C. 
''The common experiences of mankind raise a 
strong presumption and inference that such a 
breaking and entering as is here shown was made 
with the purpose of committing larceny, no other 
purpose appearing. It is sufficient to show the 
essential unlawful intent when the entry_was made 
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by circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence of 
such intent is not required. One's intent may be 
proved by his acts and conduct, and such is 
the usual and customary mode of proving in-
tent. * * *" 
In an old Utah case, People v. Morton, 1886, 11 Pa.c. 
512, this court held that where the facts are such that it 
is impossible to account for the presence of the defend-
ant in the place where he was arrested, unless on the 
hypothesis that he was there to commit larceny, a con-
viction of burglary is justified. 
The Morton and Seyfried cases . were upheld by the 
Utah Supreme Court in the 1958 case of State v. Tellay, 
324 P. 2d 490, where the contention and appeal was based 
on the same principle, as in this case, namely the insuffic-
iency of the evidence to convict appellant of burglary 
because it was not directly proved that he had the intent. 
The Court held : 
"The answer to that IS that the jury did not 
so find.'' 
A basic principle of appellate review provides that 
an appellate court will not review questions of fact for 
it is the function of the jury. The court may, however, 
make a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence, 
and if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, 
the reviewing court will not disturb it. 3 Am. Jur., Appeal 
and Error, Sec. 883, 5A C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Sec. 
1647. This court held that where there is evidence to 
support the jury's verdict, it will not be overturned by 
a reviewing court. See Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Pack-
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in.g Corpora·tion (Utah), 202 P. 2d 727; Angerman v. 
Edgemon (Utah), 290 Pac. 169; State v. Johnson. {Ida.), 
287 P. 2d 425. 
With the foregoing rules in mind, we proceed to 
consider appellant's contention, which is that since the 
evidence is largely circumstantial, does that circumstan-
tial evidence prove intent~ 
There was sufficient proof of defendant's intent as 
required by the statute. There was no direct proof of 
intent, as is the usual case in burglary prosecutions, but 
the basic circumstanti~l evidence as proved raises the 
presumption of intent. That presumption was not re-
butted at the trial. The following facts were proved: 
(1) That the door to Mrs. McBreaty's apartment 
was locked when she retired (R. 64). 
(2) That the door was found wide open the morning 
of April18, 1960 (R. 66). 
( 3) That Mrs .. Garnett saw a colored person climb 
up the ladder to Mrs. McBreaty's dining room 
window (R. 42). 
( 4) That Office:r Firth, at approximately 4 :28 A.M., 
saw· a colored person standing iri _-front of Mrs. 
J\icBreaty's dining room window (R. 74 and 76). 
( 5) That the appellant's shoes were found at the 
scene of the burglary (R. 77, 97). 
(6) That the appellant's car was located one-half 
block from the apartment (R. 87). 
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(7) That the appellant was found leaving the area 
without his car and going in a direction oppo-
site to his car (R. 82). 
(8) That appellant's explanation for being in the 
area was so illogical that counsel did not even 
attempt to put on any evidence to prove it. 
Considering the evidence adduced, there is no other 
reasonable hypothesis which the jury could have found; 
no logical explanation was made why defendant was in 
the apartment at an early hour. 
Appellant, on pages 14-15 of his brief, suggests sev-
eral statements and questions why the accused would not 
have attempted to burglarize the apartment in question. 
In answer to these, respondent must ask the appellant, 
what makes a person attempt to burglarize any apart-
ment~ The State submits that a burglar is not a logical 
person, nor is burglarizing based on logic. The questions 
and statements of appellant are not reasonable, nor were 
they suggested by the evidence at the trial. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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